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Abstract 
Contracts relying on crisis funds (including emergency funds) may bypass many safeguards 
built into normal spending processes. This study examines the literature on how these 
contracts are fulfilled for both civilian and defense crisis funds, primarily focusing on the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), disaster funds, and Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, beginning with contracts awarded in 2012 and using 
publicly available data.  
This paper discusses the challenges and contradictions that make identifying OCO-funded 
contracts difficult and then presents a methodology for classifying them. The paper then 
analyzes trends in contracting from the post-Iraq withdrawal period. This analysis focuses on 
three areas where the literature review showed that crisis contracting diverges from 
conventional contracting: noncompetitive awards, undefinitized contract actions, and 
reachback contracts. The dataset created for this study will be made publicly available to 
allow for analysis of this data by other researchers and to close an important transparency 
gap. 
Introduction 
Contracting during a crisis is replete with challenges. Speed and flexibility are 
essential because delay means that urgent needs go unmet. However, uncertainty is 
commonplace, whether the crisis is prompted by natural disasters, military conflicts, or 
economic disturbances. These conditions are vulnerable to the infamous trifecta of waste, 
fraud, and/or abuse, but even setting those extremes aside, many justifiable crisis contracts 
cannot or should not be sustained in ordinary times.  
This century has already seen a range of high-profile crisis contracting: contingency 
contracting during the invasion and subsequent occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) pursuit of shovel-ready projects in 
response to the global financial crises, and government responses to range of disasters 
such as Hurricane Katrina. Important work has been done to provide oversight and 
transparency by the Government Accountability and Transparency Board and the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting, as well as inspectors general (IGs) and others.  
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However, when the news moves on to a new set of crises and the final reports are 
filed, lessons identified in one domain may never be transferred to another. Worse yet, as 
attention fades, there is risk of backsliding because it becomes increasingly challenging to 
determine whether recommendations were followed and whether they succeeded in 
mitigating the risks that drove reform efforts. This paper is focused on Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) funded contracting after the initial withdrawal from Iraq, a 
period that benefits from efforts by the DoD to improve data transparency; this situation is 
also comparatively understudied, in no small part, because of the opaqueness and 
ambiguity surrounding the OCO budget. 
While this portion of the project is focused specifically on Department of Defense 
contracting, the study team has conducted a literature review that also includes studies of 
civilian efforts, such as the Recovery Act and disaster response efforts. Despite their 
differences, the many concerns about crisis contracting apply across domains. Likewise, the 
publicly available Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) provides a common window 
through which these distinct crisis contracts cases can be observed and compared.  
Following the literature review, this paper discusses the challenges and 
contradictions that make identifying OCO-funded contracts difficult and then presents a 
methodology for classifying them.1 The paper then analyzes trends in contracting from the 
post-Iraq withdrawal period. This analysis focuses on three areas where the literature review 
indicated that crisis contracting diverges from conventional contracting: noncompetitive 
awards, undefinitized contract actions, and reachback contracts. The paper concludes by 
summarizing initial findings from the contingency contracting dataset. 
What Is Contingency Contracting? 
Handling crises is an important part of the job of the United States military, so it 
comes as no surprise that there are explicit legal categories for crisis contracting. McMillon 
(2000) provided a helpful glossary, including contingency contracting itself:  
Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the 
full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, both 
domestic and overseas. It includes Major Regional Conflicts, Lesser Regional 
Conflicts, Military Operations Other Than War, and Domestic 
Disaster/Emergency Relief. (pp. 5–7).  
This paper also includes a similar category of operations that fall under a different 
portion of the U.S. legal code: “humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.”2  
The U.S. government extensively relied on contingency contracting after the 9/11 
attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was not a new phenomenon; with the 
move to an all-volunteer military, contractors had an important role to play from the Gulf War 
                                            
 
 
1 The study team has published a dynamic web tool for visualizing OCO-funded contracts starting in 
2012. For researchers wishing to replicate the results of this study or conduct their own research, the 
study team is sharing a complete list of the procurement identifiers and key characteristics of 
contracts in the dataset. 
2 For the full definition of contingency operations, see 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). For the full definition of 
humanitarian operations and peacekeeping, see 10 U.S.C. 2302(8). 
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to the war in Kosovo.3 Nonetheless, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent 
occupations prompted steady increases in spending on contingencies. From 2002 until 2008 
approximately, $159 billion in contracts were awarded in contingency contracts (GAO, 
2012). Specifically, emergency supplemental appropriations, which later evolved into the 
OCO budget, rapidly grew and focused on difficult to predict wartime expenses including 
contingency contracts. As Sharon Pickup and Asif Khan (2009) noted, this growth continued 
in 2007 when the “DOD revised its Financial Management Regulation, expanding the 
definition of acceptable maintenance and procurement costs and directing the military 
services to begin including ‘longer war on terror’ costs in their OCO funding requests” (p. 
11). 
The tide turned as the Iraq war wound down and President Barack Obama took 
office in 2009. The GAO had already encouraged the DoD to “shift certain contingency costs 
into the annual base budget to allow for prioritization and trade-offs among DoD’s needs and 
to enhance visibility in defense spending” (Pickup & Khan, 2009, p. 7). The changes are 
described in Table 1. The Budget Control Act, implemented by Congress in 2011, reversed 
the trend of transferring OCO funds into the base budget request (Epstein & Williams, 
2017). The BCA caps limited the funds available in the base budget, but OCO funds were 
not subject to caps. As a result, there was an opportunity and temptation to use OCO 
spending to supplement the forced decreases in the base budget (Epstein & Williams, 
2017). While the OCO budget has de facto not always been limited by these definitions, the 
study team employs the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 guidelines as part of contract labeling 
because they are compatible with a specific focus on crisis-funded contracts, rather than 
longer term and more persistent efforts. 
                                            
 
 
3 See McMillon (2000, pp. 13–23) for a summary of contracting operations in the 1990s and some of 
the challenges encountered. 
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Table 1. Fiscal Year 2010 OMB Guidance on What Qualifies as OCO Spending 




With crisis funding continuing to grow to compensate for BCA caps, it is important to 
conduct a thorough review of the positive and negative aspects of crisis contracting. Both 
civilian and military crises covered by this paper share a key trait: time is of the essence. 
When a national emergency is present, or an impending military conflict requires rapid 
acquisition, the typical procedures defined by regulation can become a hindrance. Without 
the ability to bypass them, the regulations could prevent many solutions from being 
implemented within the time frame driven by the crisis (Britt & Miles, 1985). In anticipation of 
this problem, acquisition regulations offer a range of exceptions to allow for the speed of 
acquisition called for by crisis situations. However, this approach inherently leads to 
concerns that contingency contracts do not operate in the same environment of the standard 
federal contracting process (McMillon, 2000). 
Regulatory Exemptions 
Competition has been longstanding in its presence within federal procurement 
practices. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) requires that procurements 
must enter into a full and open competition (Manuel, 2011). However, CICA also designates 
specific exemptions to competition requirements. CICA establishes seven instances when a 
contracting officer may engage in a noncompetitive procurement process (Manuel, 2011). 
Included within these exemptions are circumstances for unusual and compelling urgency, 
national security, and contracts necessary for the public interest (Manuel, 2011). Likewise, 
during a natural disaster, funds for procurement of services may disregard competition in 
cases of “urgent and compelling” situations (GAO, 2015). 
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In addition to the option to bypass full and open competition, contingency contracts 
are currently exempt from the requirement restricting undefinitized contracts and from 
having to wait until a protest is resolved to award emergency requirements (McMillon, 2000). 
Other exemptions simply involve raised thresholds. In 2000, the simplified acquisition 
threshold was twice as high for contingency contracts, increasing from $100,000 to 
$200,000 (McMillon, 2000, pp. 9–10). For other parts of government, crisis measures may 
allow for greater use of forms of contracting that the DoD already regularly relies on, such as 
cost-based contracts. Within the first reporting to Recovery.gov, the Recovery Act spent 
$7.8 billion on contracts that were noncompetitive or were not fixed price (Lipowicz, 2009).  
Limitations on Crisis Contracting 
However, while crisis contracting may employ a range of regulatory exemptions, it 
faces heightened scrutiny in other areas, particularly time frames. Certain crises may have 
even shorter time frames, depending on their expected duration. During Operation Restore 
Hope in Somalia, contracts were limited to 90 days (McMillon, 2000, pp. 16–18). These 
limitations are a measure to reduce the period that the United States is committed to deals 
that are hastily made by necessity. Without the competition requirements, crisis funding runs 
the risk of being unable to validate presented contract data with competitors or government 
sources (Dodaro, 2009). In 2009, time limitations were extended to all contracts using the 
urgency exemption: 
In 2008, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 862, amended certain laws to require that 
contracts awarded using the urgency exception not exceed the time 
necessary to meet the unusual and compelling requirements and for the 
agency to enter into another contract, and may not exceed 1 year unless the 
head of the agency determines exceptional circumstances apply. (Marvin, 
2014, p. 13) 
An area of dispute within the policy literature is whether these restrictions should be 
further institutionalized. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) was severely 
critical of non-competed contracts extended without competition, even if the original contract 
was competed:  
$36.3 billion Defense (Army) LOGCAP III contract—The Army has awarded a 
number of contracts under its worldwide Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP). Of these contracts, the largest is the LOGCAP III 
contract supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The base contract for 
LOGCAP III was awarded competitively, but lasted for 10 years without 
competition on any of its task orders. … As sole provider, without the 
discipline of task-order competition, KBR proposals included large amounts of 
questioned and unsupported costs identified by the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA). (p. 75) 
The Contingency Contracting Reform Act did not become law, but it usefully 
illuminates arguments on these issues. Section 201 of that bill sought to limit the duration of 
contingency contracts across the board by default. The bill would have limited contingency 
contracts that were not competed or that received only one offer to one year and competed 
contracts to three years (GAO, 2012). The Professional Service Council, a government 
services industry association, objected to the proposal on multiple grounds. Their primary 
point was that even in contingency contracting, shorter does not necessarily mean better: 
Primarily, the limitation on contract length fails to recognize the benefits and 
efficiencies that can be achieved by longer contract lengths. One of the key 
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lessons learned from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
was that short periods of performance significantly increased the contract 
price and added to the government’s burden to award new contracts and 
administer existing ones. (Professional Services Council, 2012, p. 6) 
Negative Outcomes of Crisis Contracting 
Regulatory exceptions and limitations on contracting officers are worth studying, but 
it is the outcomes of crisis contracting that have drawn so much negative attention to the 
area. The first challenge is that the circumstances and requirements limit the ability to 
confirm contract, grant, or loan information prior to the disbursement of funds (Dodaro, 
2009). The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) also raised this issue with 
recommendation 11 which cited a need to “improve contractor performance-data recording 
and use” (p. 10). 
This challenge can extend over the entire life of these contracts. Crisis funding for 
natural disasters can lead to increased levels of incomplete documentation, a lack of 
contract closeouts, and little to no evidence of higher level contract reviews (GAO, 2015). An 
example of this is when hotels received contracts to house those affected by the disaster 
during Hurricane Sandy. The hotels received noncompetitive contract awards through the 
urgent need justification, but the joint field contracting offices were often left unaware of 
these contract awards until the contract was closed out and they received the vendor 
invoices (GAO, 2015). 
Due to the urgency and need for a significant number of contracts in a short period of 
time, the contract closeouts can often become backed up and delay the documentation from 
being properly completed (GAO, 2015). A portion of these contracts require further approval 
from a level above the contracting officer. Of the nine contracts reviewed that required this 
approval, the GAO found only one that had received the appropriate justification (GAO, 
2015). The Recovery Act, with its emphasis on oversight and considering the comparatively 
straightforward operating environment of an economic crisis, gives a sense of what the 
baseline failure rate may be for crisis contracting. Within the grants and contracts awarded 
to broadband services under the Recovery Act, 14% were terminated before they were 
completed (Goldstein, 2014). When these contracts and grants are terminated or sustained 
with cost overruns, the lost funds can present a larger issue to the efficiency of crisis funds 
being awarded for stimulus purposes (Goldstein, 2014). 
Worse yet, as Comptroller Gene Dodaro (2009) succinctly put it, “experience tells us 
that the risk for fraud and abuse grows when billions of dollars are going out quickly” (p. 6). 
Compounding the challenges of gaps in documentation, staff are exposed to higher rates of 
fraud without the ability to conduct system edit checks or time to identify problems prior to 
disbursement of funds (Dodaro, 2009).  
Specifically within contingency contracting, fraud has been a very present issue 
(Gordon, 2014). Operating under a time-stressed environment where the need for a solution 
is overwhelming can create many opportunities for fraud (Gordon, 2014). Citing specific 
numbers for waste and fraud is always controversial, and subjective determinations of what 
constitutes waste can easily overshadow cases of outright corruption or criminality. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of these challenges is tremendous, as the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting (2011) argued that “at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 
billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan” (p. 1). 
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Past Reform Efforts Have Led to Increased Transparency 
Due to its inherent challenges, crisis contracting is an area where regulation and 
practice steadily evolve in reaction to past challenges. As with defense acquisition writ large, 
there will likely be no final equilibrium solution, but instead the system will evolve and 
reprioritize in response to the successes, or more often the failures, of past efforts. However, 
ongoing challenges do not mean that reform efforts were fruitless. This richness of data that 
enables this study is possible in no small part because of past reforms. The Recovery Act 
set a high standard for transparency, with President Obama insisting “every taxpayer dollar 
spent on our economic recovery must be subject to unprecedented levels of transparency 
and accountability” (Gaffney & Berger, 2009, p. 1). While disagreements about the Recovery 
Act persist, after stimulus funds were dispersed, Sam Rosen-Amy of OMB Watch argued, “I 
think it helped show Congress that there is a use for and a need for more information on 
where federal money is going and how it’s being used” (Holeywell, 2012, p. 2). 
The DoD has also made great strides in tracking crisis contract data, with financial 
tracking systems and contingency contract databases such as the “Synchronized Pre-
deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)” (Swan, 2012, p. 17). However, unlike FPDS 
or the Recovery Act dataset, those tools are not available to the public. Improving the ability 
of contracting officers and others within the government to make more informed award 
decisions and track contract performance plays an important role in mitigating the data gaps 
that can mask problems. However, in Laura Dickinson’s (2011) book on wartime contracting, 
she explained why the benefit of transparency regarding contracts is of direct interest to the 
public: 
As this example [regarding a Dyncorp Police Training Contract] illustrates, 
foreign affairs contracting raises serious concerns about public participation 
and transparency (which for simplicity’s sake I will often refer to collectively 
as public participation). Significantly, public participation is simultaneously a 
value in and of itself—reflecting the view that people affected by an activity 
should have some input into how that activity is carried out—and a 
mechanism for either accountability or constraint. For example, if various 
populations are able to participate in the formulation and critique of future 
plans of action, such participation may well impact the actions ultimately 
undertaken. Just as contractual arrangements may be structured to protect 
and promote public law values, so too public participation may be harnessed 
to restrain governments from abuses and help to protect other public values, 
such as human dignity and anticorruption. (p. 104) 
There are logical reasons for the different levels of public transparency between the 
Recovery Act’s public dataset and the restricted tools such as SPOT. First and foremost, 
sharing too much data when operating in conflict environments could reveal operational 
details that place U.S. personnel, vendors, or the civilian population in danger. In addition, 
this public participation role is partially fulfilled by Inspector Generals, and the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan has remained active during the study period. 
Nonetheless, Dickinson’s argument suggests that there is value in making the vetted and 
sometimes anonymized contingency contracting data more accessible, in no small part 
because “governments may outsource foreign affairs precisely to avoid oversight” 
(Dickinson, 2011, p. 105). 
Factors That Aggravate or Mitigate the Risk of Crisis Contracting  
The prior sections have touched on a range of the ways in which crisis contracting 
operates in a unique operational and regulatory environment. During the review, the study 
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team evaluated various factors apparent in regular contract reporting that aggregate or 
mitigate the inherent risks of crisis contracting. Three key criteria were applied: do multiple 
sources, ideally in multiple domains, point to this factor as a significant source of risk; is this 
factor something at least partially under the U.S. government’s control; can it be tracked 
using FPDS? By these criteria, three factors stood out: the risks of noncompetitive awards, 
the risk of UCAs, and the opportunity for expeditionary contracting offices to support home 
contracting offices, called reachback contracting. 
Noncompetitive Awards 
The option to bypass competition for urgency reasons is one of the better 
documented aspects of crisis contracting. From 2010 until 2012, only 3% of the DoD’s 
contracts were awarded in a noncompetitive environment under the urgency exception, but 
this 3% still accounts for $12.5 billion worth of funds. During this same time, State’s 
contracting efforts under contingency contracting accounted for 12.5% of contract awards 
(Marvin, 2014). An early report after the Recovery Act debuted reported that at least $7.8 
billion was awarded to noncompetitive contracts (Lipowicz, 2009). That said, this use of 
noncompetitive contracts in part was a result of relying on existing contracts. Of the 32% of 
new contracts that were awarded through the Recovery Act, 11% were awarded without 
competition (Needham, 2010). That said, these numbers should be put in context of the 
range of other forms of noncompetitive contracting employed by the government. In 2013 
alone, 36% of funds for procurement of goods and services, approximately $164 billion, 
were not competed (Marvin, 2014).  
Trade Off Between Speed and the Benefits of Competition 
The rate of competition for crisis-funded–contracting is not unusually high; instead, 
critics emphasize noncompetitive contracts because competition is often more important in a 
crisis. Higher prices can qualify as reasonable in disaster relief contracting, due to the 
significant and immediate increase in demand for a product offered by a contractor. Relief 
items in a natural disaster experience such high demands that prices significantly increase 
on goods such as water, lumber, and generators (Gordon, 2014). Marvin (2014) extended 
this finding to other forms of crisis contracting, arguing that “promoting competition—even in 
a limited form—increases the potential for quality goods and services at a lower price in 
urgent situations” (p. 1). In addition to the risk of higher prices or lower quality, 
noncompetitive contracts are also at greater risk of misconduct when compared to the 
standard procurement process (Manuel, 2011). 
Of course, the challenge is that competition does not necessarily create quickly. For 
contingency contracting, delays can undermine a unit’s effectiveness, morale, and ability to 
complete its mission (McMillon, 2000). Likewise, for the sake of the affected population in a 
natural disaster, the need to provide goods and services as soon as possible is of utmost 
importance (Mackin, 2015). While economic recession presents an easier operating 
environment, considering the primary goal of Recovery Act was to act quickly on high priority 
needs, contracting officers relied heavily on avenues that presented the fewest opportunities 
for competition to arise (Needham, 2010).  
Urgency is also not the only constraint on competition. Built into the Recovery Act 
were guidelines specific to small business programs, which effectively encouraged the use 
of noncompetitive contracts to ensure they had equal opportunities to receive assistance. In 
May 2010, approximately 80% of the noncompetitive contracts were awarded to small 
businesses through these guidelines (Needham, 2010). Similarly, natural disaster 
contracting further allows a preference in noncompetitive contracts for local area firms in the 
affected area which can aid in economic recovery (Gordon, 2014). Bontjer, Holt, and Angle 
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(2009) applied this idea to contingency contracting when they studied the impact of such 
measures in Afghanistan:  
Using local goods and services to carry out project work, for instance, allows 
a development dollar to be spent twice—providing much needed services to 
Afghan citizens and communities while simultaneously creating jobs, 
generating revenue, and promoting a more sustainable marketplace—all of 
which can ultimately reduce the likelihood of a relapse into conflict. (p. 39)  
Competition advocates do acknowledge competing needs, but given the benefits of 
even limited competition, they nonetheless urge prioritizing maximizing competition within 
those constraints (Office of Inspector General, 2016). This approach is mandated by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) which allows for urgency exceptions but still requires 
contracting officers to solicit responses from as many contractors as possible under these 
circumstances (Gordon, 2014). In the case of disaster relief, such regulations are not always 
followed. After a new competitive requirement was enacted, FEMA contracting officers 
reported that they were still instructed to treat every disaster relief contract as urgent and 
could therefore award contracts without competition. This problem created an opportunity for 
$32 million of procurement costs going unreported in noncompetitive disaster relief contracts 
in FY2013 (Mackin, 2015). The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) similarly 
believed that there was room for more competition, and it proposed the government should 
“set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency contracts” (p. 10).  
Duration Limits on Noncompetitive Contracts 
As was discussed in the section Limitations on Crisis Contracting, noncompetitive 
contracts that use the urgency exception are limited only one year to reduce the risk of 
overspending (Marvin, 2014; Office of Inspector General, 2016). With that said, the cost and 
benefits of a shorter contract are disputed (Professional Services Council, 2012). Reform 
efforts after Hurricane Katrina resulted in an even stricter 150-day limit to disaster relief 
contracts awarded in a noncompetitive environment (Mackin, 2015). Contingency 
contracting, on the other hand, is allowed to award contracts for up to a year in a 
noncompetitive environment (Office of Inspector General, 2016).  
Upon the GAO’s review of noncompetitively awarded contracts, more than half 
exceeded the 150-day time limit. This is not necessarily a problem; the agency can waive 
that requirement under certain conditions. However, in each of these contracts that violated 
the time limit, FEMA did not approve the extension, and some went beyond the regulation 
by a year and a half (Mackin, 2015).  
Undefinitized Contract Actions 
Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) are a type of contract that differs from 
standard procurement methods in allowing the production to start without defining all the 
terms of the contract (Actions, 2017).4 In crisis funding situations, these contracts can be 
seen as advantageous because they allow the production of goods or the allocation of 
services to be immediately received (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). Circumstances 
created by crisis funding certainly qualify as circumstances of urgent need that can allow for 
                                            
 
 
4 Letter Contracts are a subset of UCAs in that they specifically seek to start production of the goods 
immediately (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
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UCAs (Marvin, 2014). Contingency contracts often utilize UCAs, and they can be coupled 
with the risk of awarding them without competition. Contingency contracts often utilize UCAs 
which can be coupled with the risk of awarding them without competition (Federal Audit 
Executive Council, 2010).  
UCAs are entered under cost reimbursement contracts until later defined. This allows 
the vendor to be reimbursed for all reasonable costs within the procurement up until the 
point of defining the contract terms (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). While the initial 
award of the contract can be obligated without the terms set, the FAR still requires that 
within 180 days or when 40% of the work has been completed that the contract terms must 
be defined (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010).This allows the vendor to be reimbursed 
for all reasonable costs within the procurement process up until the point of defining the 
contract terms (Federal Audit Executive Council, 2010). The vendor, not the customer, is 
responsible for determining a “reasonable” price for this initial work (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
UCAs are to have, at the least, a “not to exceed” price amount stated at the beginning. 
However, upon awarding the UCA, up to 50% of the “not to exceed” amount can be paid 
without any approval or review (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).  
Unfortunately, UCAs also create a very high risk of overpaying for goods and 
services and at times make the contracting officer beholden to the vendor (Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011). In cases of disaster relief contracting, 
they present an even higher risk of cost overruns. Gordon (2014) mentioned that when 
natural disasters occur, the price of needed materials significantly increases as the demand 
for these products skyrocket. Entering into a UCA through a noncompetitive award furthers 
the risk of the government overpaying for needed goods and services to provide relief to the 
affected areas (Gordon, 2014). 
Historically, the use of UCAs presented high risk with contingency contract awards 
and led to schedule delays coupled with high cost overruns. The GAO reviewed 77 UCA 
awards for contingency contracting within the DoD and in 10 cases found that other 
contracting methods would have sufficed and promoted cost savings. In 2007, 60% of these 
cases DoD contracting officers failed to definitize contract award terms by the 180-day FAR 
regulation (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). By 2008, although still a concerning number, the amount 
of cases failing to meet the definitize timeline decreased to 51%. Furthermore, the GAO 
found that out of 83 reviewed UCAs, 66 resulted in paying the awardee 45% or more of the 
not to exceed estimate at the award (Hutton, 2010). 
From 2001 to 2005, obligations awarded under UCAs increased from $5.98 billion to 
$6.53 billion (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).5 UCA data collection was not centralized within the 
DoD, leading the DoD to have a significant lack of data to properly evaluate how much is 
truly being spent under UCA conditions (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). Since 2007, the DoD has 
taken measures to require centralized reporting of UCAs, but in 2010, the GAO found that 
many UCAs are not being properly reported to the centralized offices (Hutton, 2010). On 
average, DoD UCA contracts overran the 180-day definitization requirement by two months 
(Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). The Air Force was the only branch at the time to have requirements 
to report UCAs, but despite reporting requirements, the GAO found nine UCA contracts in 
                                            
 
 
5 It is important to note that these costs do not include obligations awarded to undefinitized task order 
contract or UCA modifications (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007). 
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the Air Force that overran the 180-day requirement by at least a full year (Calvaresi-Barr, 
2007). A majority of the UCA contracts were awarded to maintain program schedules and 
directly and indirectly support war efforts (Hutton, 2010). While there is the opportunity to 
waive the 180-day requirement, the GAO found only two of the contingency contracts that 
met the requirements necessary to waive the regulation in 2007 (Calvaresi-Barr, 2007).  
The Office of the Inspector General had similar findings to the GAO on UCAs in 
2012. Out of 251 UCAs reviewed, the Inspector General’s Office found that 132 cases failed 
to meet the timeline for definitization (Office of Inspector General, 2012). 118 of the cases 
highlighted noncompliance with requirements on the impact of allowable profit on the 
undefinitized period (Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 64 of the cases resulted in an 
obligation of funds significantly above the allowable amounts (Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012). 
Reachback Contracting  
At least as important as the methods used in contingency contracting are the 
contracting officers charged with managing the system. McMillon in 2000 reviewed four 
different military contingencies since the end of the Cold War and found that “consistent 
problems for all components during contingencies have been the lack of experienced 
personnel, restrictive regulations, and a lack of proper supplies such as computers and 
contracting SOPs and forms” (McMillon, 2000, p. 23). The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were dramatically different operating environments than the 
prior decade’s humanitarian operations or even the first Gulf War. Nonetheless, in 2011, the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) reached similar conclusions, recommending 
that the government “provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to 
protect the government’s interests” (pp. 4, 11).  
Given the inherent challenges of deploying people and resources to the field, one 
straightforward approach to this problem is to rely on those not on the battlefield. One 
prominent implementation of this idea is reachback contracting, a unique method that allows 
contracting officers in the field to “reachback” to domestic contracting offices for contracting 
support in contingency operations (Dunn, 2016). In 2007, the Reachback Division was 
originally set up to offer contracting support to those in theater in Kuwait (Adrian, 2010). This 
idea was not entirely novel, particularly in the later stages of an operation. McMillon (2000) 
noted that the Air Force instructed contracting officers to “consider support from the unit’s 
home base” in addition to a range of other options outside of the deployment area (p. 34). 
Within three years, the division grew to a team of 62 people supporting contracting officers 
in the field in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar (Adrian, 2010). After years of successful 
trials and results, the Reachback Division grew to include the Air Force and then added 
members from the Expeditionary Contracting Command Contingency Contracting Team 
(Adrian, 2010).  
Reviews of this approach were positive. Commanding General Michael Hoskin of 
U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command referred to reachback as a “very effective 
tool” in the contracting officers’ arsenal (Dunn, 2016). Reachback contracting can result in 
fewer deployed contracting officers because the workload is shifted back to domestic 
contracting offices (Dunn, 2016). Utilizing reachback methods, contracting officers could 
improve their strategic buying and develop greater expertise within their source selection 
(Ausink, Castaneda, & Chenoweth, 2011). Furthermore, reachback contracting can provide 
continuity to workflow management and create better standardization for contingency 
contract reporting (Dunn, 2016).  
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Reachback’s intention was to help ease the challenges faced by field contracting 
officers in attempts to support the warfighter (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). Reachback is able 
to provide support in the Financial Services Division, Contracting Policy, Property Expertise, 
and the Army Sustainment Command Counsel (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). Specializing in 
logistics, warehousing, transportation, base operations, security, counterinsurgency, 
telecommunications service, and supply acquisitions, reachback provides needed support to 
contingency contracting (Calhoun & Larssen, 2013). 
In its review of reachback capabilities, RAND found that most contingency 
contracting officers cared more about the advantages in workflow, standardization of 
requirements, and concentration of contracting expertise then the reduction in deployments 
(Ausink et al., 2011). Reachback contracting has the potential to lower costs and reduce 
risks by not having to incur the same transportation and hazardous duty pay (Ausink et al., 
2011). Workflow continuity could help increase the efficiency as well, since the contracting 
officers do not experience the same amount of turnover that deployed CCOs experience 
(Ausink et al., 2011). Reachback has been used in a multitude of ways. From small 
commodity purchases to cradle-to-grave large contract support, reachback methods have 
been successfully implemented (Ausink et al., 2011).  
Although reachback methods can be used in various applications, the RAND study 
noted that reachback provides the greatest benefit when used for commodities, highly 
technical items, the use of a government-wide purchasing card, theater-wide purchases, 
and long-term contracts (Ausink et al., 2011). Each of these areas received multiple sources 
of agreement and near universal government-wide support of benefitting from reachback 
practices (Ausink et al., 2011). In the case of urgent and local projects, many turned away 
from the benefits that reachback practices could offer (Ausink et al., 2011). Limitations can 
also arise from policies applied to specific contingencies: the Iraqi first and Afghan first 
policies prevented field contracting officers from utilizing reachback practices due to the 
local requirements (Ausink et al., 2011).  
If reachback had been utilized for the areas mentioned above in FY2008, 40 field 
contracting officers would not have needed to have been deployed (Ausink et al., 2011). 
Beyond reducing deployments, reachback methods provide greater concentrations of 
contracting expertise and continuity of the contracting officials maintaining the contracts 
(Ausink et al., 2011). The RAND study concludes that when used in the appropriate 
categories, reachback can mitigate risk, save cost, and provide greater efficiency in 
contingency contracts (Ausink et al., 2011).  
Identifying Contingency Contracts 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011) reported that spending on contracts 
and grants performed in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of operations in those countries 
was expected to exceed $206 billion through the end of FY2011 (p. 2). During that same 
period, transactions directly labeled as contingency contracts could only account for less 
than $30 billion in obligations. The study team identified three different ways that data fields 
available in FPDS could be used to classify contingency contracts.  
 The Contingency, Humanitarian, or Peacekeeping Operation column, which 
has better coverage in earlier years and makes explicit reference to the 
relevant statutes. 
 The National Interest Action field, which has seen more frequent use in 
recent years and includes designators for natural disasters as well as 
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contingencies. Only those Actions pertaining to contingencies by the U.S. 
military were considered labeled as contingency contracts. 
 Some transactions indirectly label themselves by employing a waiver to 
Central Commercial Registry reporting requirements that are only available to 
deployed contracting officers deployed into a contingency. As a result, FPDS 
lacks Registry information for these transactions, but we do learn that they 
were conducted in a contingency environment. 
Perhaps the most surprising characteristic of these data fields is how little they 
overlap with one another. Both identify tens of billions of contracts, yet less than a quarter of 
contracts are considered contingency efforts by both criteria. While these fields are 
contradictory and only captured a portion of the universe of contingency contracting, they 
were a valuable launchpad for creating the heuristic score by which other contracts were 
classified. This study uses a 10-point scale to label contracts, based on a range of 
contingency-related characteristics. For each of the criteria below, when the history of 
officially labeled contingency contracts being referenced covers the period from 2000 to 
2016 and all obligation amounts are in constant 2015 dollars. 
OCO Funding (Maximum 4 Points) 
 0 to 4 points: corresponding to the percent of the contract’s funding account 
that was made up by enacted OCO spending. A funding account with no 
OCO funding would receive 0 points, a funding account with full funding 
provided through OCO would receive 4 points, those in between are rounded 
to the nearest whole number.  
The study team relied on spreadsheets provided by the DoD comptroller to classify 
the percentage of OCO appropriation in each DoD funding account for each year. This data 
was then linked to the FPDS using treasury account fields, which have been reliably 
available in FPDS since 2012. These funding accounts are only partially standardized, 
requiring the team to make judgment calls on classification when treasury account symbols 
did not align. 
Place of Performance and Contracting Office (Maximum 4 Points) 
Table 2. Contracting Office and Place of Performance 
 
These two criteria work in tandem to overcome one of the main sources of ambiguity 
in the contract data. Bases in neighboring countries are often key to contingency efforts, but 
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without proper labeling, it can be challenging to identify what activity any given contract is 
supporting. Past CSIS research efforts have also uncovered major expenditures being 
classified as performed far away from the battlefield. Specifically, a surprising amount of 
contracting obligations were “performed” in Switzerland to deliver supplies to Afghanistan. 
The Product or Service Being Purchased (Maximum 2 Points): 
 2 points: Product or service codes with at least 25% of obligations labeled as 
contingency contracts. 
 1 point: Product or service codes with between 10 and 25% of obligations 
labeled as contingency contracts. 
 1 point: Product or service codes with at least $1 billion in labeled OCO 
expenditures from. 
 -1 point: Product or service codes with at least $1 billion in total expenditures, 
but no OCO labeled obligations. 
 -1 point: Contracts funded by Procurement or RDT&E accounts with an 
anticipated contract duration of more than 1 year. Such contracts are 
excluded from OCO funding by OMB guidance (Pickup & Khan, 2009, p. 14). 
Many of the items categorized through this process are consistent with McMillon’s list 
of “Examples of supplies … include bottled water, food, office and field supplies, 
construction items, repair parts, and medical supplies. Contracted services may include 
construction, laundry, food service, transportation, billeting, utilities maintenance, and 
sanitation services” (McMillon, 2000, p. 9). Unexpectedly, security services were not 
captured by these automatically generated lists. Private security contractors have been 
among the most controversial recipients of contingency contractors, and the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting (2011) recommended that they be “phased out for certain functions” 
(2011, p. 4). 
Initial Results 
After assigning scores to transactions during the study period, the team found that 
entries scoring 6 points or more reliably shared traits with contingency contracts. As the 
above graph shows, these contracts have reduced in their prevalence during the downturn 
but have also continued to shrink in value even as total contracting began to rebound in 
2016. 
One of the larger drivers of this decline has been the continued reduction in contract 
spending, first due to the withdrawal from Iraq and then to a lesser degree reinforced as the 
footprint of U.S. operations in Afghanistan was reduced. OCO spending has not gone away 
during this period, and U.S. operations in Iraq have resumed. However, Figure 1 shows the 
same pattern reduction with confirmed OCO contracts and those identified via the heuristic 
method. 
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 Contract Spending by OCO Evaluation and Place of Performance 
Analysis of competition trends within the contingency dataset confirms findings from 
the literature review. While competition is an area of concern for contingency contracts, 
crisis-funding has not prevented contracting officers from already achieving higher rates of 
competition than across facility-related services and constructions (FRS&C), other services, 
and supplies in most years. The finding that most noncompetitive contracts employ an only 
one source exception in contrast to the urgency exception (which is reported in the no 
competition (other) category) departs from the literature review. 
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 Competition Across Facility-Related Services and Construction, Other 
Services, and Supplies 
While competition is more prevalent in contingency contracting, the trend has 
changed for the worse. Figure 2 also shows that noncompetitive contracting has become 
more prevalent in all three categories. The trend is most alarming in FRS&C where 
competition rates have cratered, which is particularly troubling because this is classically a 
sector where a range of different vendors can easily enter to provide services. The trend for 
other services involves a slow decline, which is typical in contracting markets. However, the 
rise in noncompetitive contracts in supplies is not necessarily as problematic as it first 
appears. Much of the decline has been in competition that results in only a single offer. 
Noncompetitive procedures do have tools to help when only one vendor is available, so 
going directly to these arrangements may be preferable to competitions that only ever attract 
one vendor. Nonetheless, the goods acquired in contingency contracting are often simpler 
than the advanced weapon systems acquired domestically. There may be an opportunity in 
this sector for greater use of competition. 
When it comes to UCA contracting, the concerns raised in the literature appear to 
have been addressed. Usage is declining across the board and in recent years there are no 
reported UCA contracts in FRS&C or for supplies. The takeaway here is that perhaps the 
acquisition community should be less concerned about UCAs in contingency contracting 
and more focused on ensuring that they do not return to the past prevalence level in the 
category of conventional supply contracting.  
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 Undefinitized Contract Actions Across Facility-Related Services and 
Construction, Other Services, and Supplies 
Closing Thoughts 
Competitive trends appear to be in keeping with past results, but it does show the 
risk of relapse as contingency contracts are less used and are further from the public eye. 
While the sums being discussed are much smaller than in prior years, there may be room to 
regain previous rates of competition. By comparison, the dramatic reduction in UCA contract 
usage in recent years is a laudatory trend and may mean that reformers should focus on the 
remaining pockets of UCA elsewhere, although the study team will watch this space 
carefully in the next steps of this project, which consider the civilian forms of crisis 
contracting. The strongest signal from this research is the increasing divergence between 
the spending on OCO budget accounts and related contingency contracts. Future iterations 
of this study will examine this discrepancy and what it means for this challenging form of 
contracting. 
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